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Should Prisoners Be Permitted to 
Serve as Subjects of Research? 
Larry I. Palmer 
Editor's note: This is a revised and condensed version of a 
paper Professor Palmer delivered on January 7, 1976, to the 
National Minority Conference on Human Experimentation 
sponsored by the National Urban Coalition. 
Suppose a drug manufacturer wants to test the toxicity of a 
new drug that will relieve the discomforts of common colds. 
Suppose a leading cancer researcher needs healthy people 
for a study to determine if cancer can be transmitted by 
inoculation of "live cancer cells." ~ -
Suppose a psychologist wants to 
determine if a drug is as effective 
a means of controlling assaultive 
acts as is solitary confinement in a 
maximum security prison. Sup-
pose a university researcher wants 
to administer a questionnaire to 
female prisoners concerning the 
uncertain lives of their children. 
Should prisoners be permitted 
to serve as subjects for proposed 
research of the foregoing kinds? 
The simple answer is that it all 
depends. But on what? And there 
simplicity ends. The interests in-
volved must be identified, evalu-
ated, weighed, and balanced. But 
this will not be enough, for the combinations of interests 
and the conflicts between them depend on the nature of the 
proposed research and other factors. Thus differential anal-
yses, not some single general answer, are called for. For 
example, we should allow prisoners to consent to be inter-
viewed for research on prison life but not to be experi-
mented on with dangerous drugs. 
The issues are not merely academic. Considerable research 
already occurs in prisons, and proposals for further research 
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are reguiarly made to prison officials throughout the country. 
On July 12, 1974, Congress passed Public Law 93-348, 
which established the National Commission for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search. The commission was instructed to study a variety of 
ethical and legal issues surrounding human experimentation 
including issues of fetal research and psychosurgery and the 
effects of experimentation on the delivery of health care. 
The commission was also instructed to determine the require-
ments of informed consent for 
experiments on prisoners, chil-
dren, and the mentally ill. 
It is evident that the commis-
sion and any person confronting 
the problem of use of prisoners 
in research must at the outset 
take into account the interest in-
divid~al prisoners have in being 
treated as human beings, worthy 
of respect. They have an interest 
in being allowed to exercise free 
choice in deciding whether to 
participate in a research project, 
I for above all, a human being is a 
self-determining being. 
Autonomy is of special sig-
.. nificance to a prisoner, for pris-
oners have little to make choices about. 
People who propose using prisoners for research should 
be mindful that several factors diminish the likelihood that 
a prisoner's consent will be as voluntary as that of a non-
prisoner. The wages prisoners receive are extraordinarily 
low; yet prisoners need money for the few luxuries of prison 
life-cigarettes, for example. Thus prisoners are specially 
vulnerable to monetary research inducements. Also, there is 
little to do in prison. Prisoners might volunteer simply to es-
cape the boredom of prison life. Further, conditioas in 
most of our prisons are such that some prisoners will readily 
volunteer if the research gives them the opportunity to be 
isolated from more violent and aggressive prisoners. To the 
extent such factors influence prisoners' decisions to partici-
pate in research, those choices are less voluntary than would 
be choices of nonprisoners. 
Another aspect of the prisoner's interest in genuinely 
choosing whether to participate in research is one that ap-
plies also to people out of prison. Consent is always given 
to something, and it is in the nature of some research that 
the parties proposing it cannot fully describe for the prisoner 
all that will be involved. It goes without saying that there 
can be no such thing as genuine assent to unknown risks. Of 
course, researchers should be required to be as specific as 
possible about known risks, both short run and long run. 
Sometimes risks can be described in advance only in general 
terms. Is assent genuine when this is so ? Certainly in the 
optimal case of genuine assent the prisoner would be faith-
fully told all that might happen to him, and with precise 
predictive accuracy. 
Still another aspect of the prisoner's interest in genuinely 
assenting is the individual's capacity for such assent. Surely 
those who for psychological reasons might not be able to 
exercise a considered judgment should be removed from 
the pool of research prospects. Analogously, it may be that 
some prisoners are more or less by nature averse to long-
term risks. When this can be reliably determined, they too 
should be removed from the pool of research prospects, at 
least whenever the research project involves such risks. The 
rationale for such actions calls forth a second basic interest 
of both prisoners and society, namely the interest in not tak-
ing advantage of demonstrated human weakness. If it be 
objected that this is paternalism, it is of a kind borne of a 
concern for those who have dramatically evinced the rele-
vant weaknesses. 
Besides the foregoing interests, there are still others. Even 
if the conditions for genuine assent are present, and a pool 
of potential volunteers is readily identifiable, there will still 
be some forms of research that our society should not per-
mit anyone to do on human beings. Among other things, it 
must be remembered that what research the state permits in 
prisons will have symbolic significances in the larger society. 
The symbolism takes on special meaning, too, given the· 
proportion of minority groups incarcerated in our prisons. 
By almost any definition of disadvantaged or minority, 
the majority of our prisoners are disadvantaged. The prob-
lem of the use of racial or other minorities as experimental 
subjects looms large in our culture also because of our experi-
ence with the Nazi concentration camp experiments. It be-
hooves a country that has used the sanctions of law against 
the Nazi scientists to avoid using the disadvantaged in its 
own society for scientific experiments in which nonprisoners 
would not willingly participate. 
Also, the use of such drastic "experimental" techniques 
as psychosurgery ought not to be permitted in prisons until 
the techniques are adequately developed and determined to 
be effective with noninstitutional patients. The evidence 
indicates that the effectiveness of psychosurgery as treatment 
is not yet known. Hence, it should not be used, even on 
"consenting" prisoners. 
Sentencing Goals 
Society has, of course, reasons for imprisoning people and 
an interest in the fulfillment of sentencing go;;.ls. The pool 
of prospective volunteers should not be developed without 
regard to possible inconsistencies between the nature of the 
proposed research and the sentencing goals as they apply 
concretely to an individual. When there is significant incon-
sistency in a particular case, the individual should be re-
moved from the potential volunteer pool. 
Above all, participation in scientific research should not 
become a substitute for fulfillment of sentencing goals. Con-
sider this extreme example: A prisoner on death row may be 
willing to incur great risk of personal harm in a research 
project in substitution for the death penalty. Should he be 
·permitted to do so ? Surely not. Assuming the death penalty 
in this case is imposed partly as a deterrent to others, it 
would frustrate this goal to permit the substitution. 
Perhaps the nature of the particular sentencing goal 
should be taken into account, and if that goal is of little 
importance to society, it may be that we should discount the 
inconsistency. Consider for example, whether the inmates of 
a city jail should be used in a controlled experiment involv-
ing heroin maintenance. If the purpose of legal confinement 
of heroin addicts is to treat them, would an administrator of 
the jail be justified in deciding that a pilot program might 
be tried ? The answer to this question depends on one's 
theories of heroin addiction, on one's attitude toward the 
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prevailing ethic of treatment of prisoners, which is under 
heavy attack, and on one's attitude about the efficacy of the 
alternatives-jail, methadone treatment, or outright release. 
So far nothing has been said about the societal interest 
in the advancement of scientific knowledge. Were it not for 
this interest, there could be no justification for research on 
prisoners. Yet, this is neither a monolithic nor an overriding 
interest. There are many varieties of knowledge, some worth 
less than others. In judging research proposals, one should 
consider the nature of the knowledge involved. Even when 
it is plain that the research payoff may be great, it hardly 
follows that this interest should be simply weighed and 
balanced against any and all other interests that happen to 
conflict. 
A Need for Priority Principles 
In my scheme of values, and I hope in that of others, I 
see a need for priority principles as well as for a balancing 
calculus . .And these are not alternatives. Balancing is simply 
not appropriate with respect to some conflicting interests. 
For example, if conditions for genuine assent are signifi-
cantly absent, the research should not go forward, regardless 
of the prospective gains in knowledge. Or if the research 
plainly involves a significant risk of long-term physical or 
psychological harm, again it should not be permitted, re-
gardless of its importance. Or if the research plainly con-
flicts in significant ways with relevant sentencing goals, the 
proposal should be turned down. 
These are priority principles, not balancing maxims. Such 
principles give priority to basic interests. It may be true that 
balancing is necessary to arrive at priority principles in the 
first place, but this is an entirely different matter from that 
of balancing conflicting interests in assessing research pro-
posals case by case. There will be cases where balancing will 
be appropriate. The priority principles do not control all the 
cases. 
In sum, for decision makers to make sound judgments 
about the conduct of prison research, we must perform a 
variety of tasks: We must gather relevant facts about prison 
conditions, prison populations, research activities, and ad-
ministrative personnel. Using these facts, we must identify 
the various interests involved. Then we must evaluate and 
weigh these interests. The inevitability of conflicting inter-
ests in particular cases must be considered and any priority 
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principles devised. In devising such principles, we will also 
be determining the proper scope for a balancing approach 
to the assessment of particular research proposals. 
Before closing, I want to underscore the problems of re-
search administration and implementation. Plainly, some-
thing should tum on the kind of personnel who are to 
assess proposals in the first place and the nature of the pro-
cedures they are to follow in doing so. We should design 
procedures that allow for continual review of the research 
that occurs in prisons; and we should assure that prison-
ers have full access to courts, commissions, and legislative 
committees. Furthermore, where the research proposal in-
volves some risks of harm to participants, something should 
turn on the nature of the safeguards built into the proposal 
to combat and minimize these risks. 
The recently established commission, and any others that 
may succeed it, are unlik~ly to provide answers to questions 
about whether and when prisoners should be used as experi-
mental subjects. We are just beginning the necessary soci-
etal inquiry and review. We are likely to find ourselves in a 
long period of inquiry. This inquiry is long overdue and 
should have begun when we punished Nazi doctors and 
scientists at the conclusion of World War II for their 
crimes against humanity. 
Professor Palmer teaches criminal law 
and procedure and gives a seminar on 
human experimentation. 
